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More than 400 banks failed during the recent financial crisis. Bank failures have a significant 
impact on the financial system and the economy as a whole. It is important to identify factors 
that may contribute to bank failures so that banks can take measures to reduce their default risk. 
This paper examines how bank specific characteristics and economic conditions affect bank 
failures during the recent financial crisis. We employ the logistic regression model to study this 
issue using data of all U. S. commercial bank insured by FDIC over the sample period 2007-
2012. We find that the ratio of the loan and leases to total assets, real estate loan ratio, and non-
performing loan ratio have a positive influence on the bank failures while capital adequacy ratios, 
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1. Introduction 
Banks are financial intermediaries whose liabilities are mainly short-term deposits and 
whose assets are usually short-term and long-term loans to businesses and consumers. When the 
value of their assets falls short of the value of their liabilities, banks are insolvent (Demirguc-
Kunt, Detragiache 1998). From 2000 to 2007, 32 banks were closed. Starting in 2008, when 
financial crisis hit the economy, 30 banks were closed. This number jumped to 148 bank failures 
in 2009 and 150 bank failures in 2010. In 2011, the number of failed banks dropped to 92 and 
there were 41 failures through the third quarter of 2012. 
Insolvency of a bank can have a wide range of effects. Depositors, individuals, and 
organizations can lose their deposits that are in excess of the amount insured by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation. Moreover, an increase of bank failures can affect the overall 
economic health and the stability of a nation. Therefore, because of these potential effects, the 
banking industry is highly regulated. It is essential to identify factors that may contribute to bank 
failure so that banks can take measures to eliminate the risk.  
Over the years, there have been several banking crises recognized by scholars. Scholars 
have done researches aiming at identifying factors that lead to bank failures to help regulatory 
agencies and organizations to take measures and prevent such tragedy. However, researchers 
such as Wheelock and Wilson (2000) and Estrella, Park, and Peristiani (2000) have used samples 
from earlier banking crises in the 1980s and 1990s. In addition, Cebula, Koch, and Fenili (2011) 
analyzed the impact of macro factors on bank failure and Cole and White (2011) and Samad and 
Glenn (2012) all analyzed data on bank failures until 2009. This paper aims to use the most 
current data to analyze bank-specific factors that may impact the solvency of a bank. We are also 
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interested in investigating the question of whether financial ratios have the same impact on bank 
failure in different asset groups. 
Accordingly, the purpose of this research is to compare the financial characteristics 
between failed and survived banks and test additional factors that have an impact on the solvency 
of banks. The second section of this paper provides an overview of previous literature’s 
contribution to the topic. The third section introduces the model used and variables that are 
included in the model. The fourth section is a discussion of results and interpretation of the 
results obtained. The last section of this study provides the preliminary conclusions and 
evaluations. This paper provides a comparison of the of different capital adequacy ratios that 
cause bank failure during financial crisis. In addition, the contribution of this paper is that we 
addressed this issue using an updated dataset from 2007 to third quarter to 2012. 
2. Literature Review 
The majority of studies have identified some contributing factors to bank failures for the 
past banking crisis during the 1980s. The consensus is that the overall economic condition 
contributes to the systematic risks that affect bank performance. Cebula (2010) and Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache (1998) included the real GDP growth rate as a factor in their papers. 
Empirical results agreed with their hypothesis that real GDP growth is negatively correlated with 
the possibility of bank failures. That is, when the economic condition is good and the real GDP 
growth is high, banks are less likely to fail. The Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock Index had also 
been used as an indicator of the overall economic condition. Cebula (2011) included the standard 
deviation of the monthly average of S&P 500 in 1970-2009 in his linear model, and he found that 
stock market volatility had positive impact on bank failure rate.     
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Apart from macroeconomic influence on banks, bank specific characteristics also 
contribute to failure during the recent financial crisis. Banks’ liabilities, or generally, loans, are 
risky. Therefore, the quality of loans can have significant impact on banks’ solvency. The 
subprime mortgage crisis of 2007/08 followed by financial crisis that started since mid 2008 has 
severely impacted the banking industry. Huge write-downs in mortgages erode the capital base 
of banks (Balasubramanyan 2010). Credit risk is a function of the quality of a bank’s loans and is 
commonly used to evaluate bank risks. Samad (2012) used the probit model to discuss the 
influence of credit risk on bank survival during the 2009 financial crisis. He concluded that loan 
ratios, such as credit loss provision to net charge, loan loss allowance to loans, and non-current 
loans to total loans, are significant factors to predict bank failures. Cole and White (2011) 
identified the types of loans that influence banks’ solvency in their paper. They found that real-
estate loans play a critical role in determining the survival of banks. Other loans, such as real 
estate construction and development loans, commercial mortgages, and multi-family mortgages, 
are consistently associated with a higher likelihood of bank failure. In addition, nonperforming 
loans, which includes loans that are past due for 30 or more days and non-accruing loans, are 
also tested in models. Shaffer (2012) used the logit regression method to test three different 
sample groups: bank data of 1984, 1989 and 2008. He found that banks’ risk of failure was more 
sensitive to nonperforming loans in 2008 than in the 1980s. 
Capital ratios have also been used when evaluating factors that contribute to bank failure.  
Some ratios that are used in recent literature are leverage ratios, capital ratios, and capital to 
gross revenue ratio. Wheelock and Wilson (2000) used total equity divided by total assets and 
found that less well-capitalized banks are at greater risk of failure. Estrella, Park, and Peristiani 
(2000) examined bank failure during 1988-1992 and tested different capital ratios and bank 
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failure rate. Their examination of this relationship suggests that, in addition to risk-weighted 
ratio, leverage ratio and capital to gross revenue are significant factors in predicting bank failures 
during the period. Leverage ratio, or the most commonly used debt-to-equity ratio, is used to 
evaluate a financial institution’s ability to meet debt obligations. Capital adequacy ratios, also 
called capital to risk weighted assets ratio, evaluates a bank’s capital compared to its risk. The 
most commonly used capital adequacy ratio is the tier one capital ratio. Samad (2011) used 
ANOVA test to examine the relationship between a bank’s capital adequacy and the possibility 
of failure. The variables he used are tier 1 capital as a percentage of average total assets, tier 1 
capital as a percentage of risk-weighted assets, and total risk-based capital as a percentage of 
risk-weighted assets. The results strongly support the hypothesis that low capital-holding ratios 
contributed to the failure of banks during 2008-2009. From various studies, it is clear that 
adequate capital is essential to bank survival during economic downturn.  
In addition to capital adequacy, bank size is also an important factor that may influence 
bank solvency. Cole and White (2011) tested their model of fitness for different bank asset 
groups. Most contributing factors hold for both small and large banks but there are a few 
variations in terms of bank size. Return on Assets (ROA) is a weaker negative influence on 
failures for large banks than for small banks. On the other hand, securities play no role in failures 
for large banks but have a significant influence on small banks. Balasubramanyan, Stefanou, and 
Stokes (2010) focused only on banks in high-risk states of Florida, Georgia, Illinois, and Ohio, 
found that mortgage-backed securities and bank cost efficiency are negatively correlated only in 
the case of large banks. Because large banks are perceived to be more stable, they tend to engage 
in more hedging and portfolio reconfiguration activities than small banks. Consequently, the 
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capitals of these banks are severely influenced by the mild housing market and people who 
cannot pay mortgage in economic downturn.  
 As the literature review shows, bank financial performance data does exhibit a predictive 
power in assessing potential failure of commercial banks. Although these factors have already 
been significantly studied over the past decades, most scholars discussed either systemic factors 
or bank specific factors in their papers. Our model gives an explanation that combines both 
macroeconomic factors and bank specific factors. Moreover, these papers employed bank 
financial data through 2009, while the result of this paper is based on quarterly data from 2007 to 
third quarter of 2012. Unlike previous literature that mostly use sample size of only hundred of 
banks, our data set contains all commercial banks over the 23 quarters studied.  
3. Methodology and Variables 
3.1 Regression Model 
The literature discussed above leads to a general hypothesis that economic downturn, 
together with bank financial ratios, are significantly related to banks’ failures. In our regression 
model, the dependent variable FAIL is a binary variable which equals to one if a bank fails and 
zero otherwise. Since the dependent variable is binary, it would be inappropriate to use Ordinary-
Least-Squares models. The conceptual problem with linear regression with a dichotomous 
dependent variable stems from the fact that probabilities have maximum and minimum values of 
1 and 0. Depending on the slope of the line and the observed values, a model can give predicted 
values of the dependent variable above 1 and below 0 (Pampel 2000). In this case, we choose to 
run the Logistic Regression Model, or Logit Model, similar to the literature (Shaffer, 2012; Cole 
and White, 2012). The merit of logit model is that it can be written as a linear model for the log 
odds, which makes it simpler to interpret than the probit model (Chen and Wong, 2004).  
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The dependent variable takes on two values, 1 and 0. We assign the status of failed banks 
as 1 and the status of survived banks as 0. By the definition of logistic model, the dependent 
variable can be written as the linear combination of independent variables. Unit changes of 
independent variables in the model will change the possibility of bank failure. Positive 
coefficients indicate that every one unit increase of the independent variable, the possibility of 
bank failure will increase by the coefficient. In the same manner, negative coefficients imply that 
increase in one unit of the independent variable will cause the possibility of bank failure decrease 
by the coefficient. Independent variables and their calculations are discussed in the next section. 
3.2 Data and Variables 
 We collect our data from the FDIC Call Reports and the Uniform Bank Performance 
Reports from the FDIC website (www. fdic.gov). The time frame of this study spans from 2007 
to the third quarter of 2012. Independent variables are drawn from different financial statements, 
such as balance sheet, income statement, and capital analysis form from the UBPR bulk data set. 
The number of banks included in a single quarter is around 7000. Variations in bank numbers are 
due to mergers and acquisitions within the banking industry that caused some financial data of 
acquired banks to be unavailable. The number of failed banks is identified in accordance to the 
failed bank list provided by FDIC. Thus, we excluded institutions that have been acquired during 
the surveyed period in this research. In addition, we also excluded some institutions that have 
missing data or extreme values. Our dataset contains 162,890 cases for the 23 quarters from 
2007:Q1-2012:Q3. The variables used in this analysis are summarized in Table 1.  
Loan Loss Reserve (LLR) is calculated by dividing allowance for loans and leases by 
total assets. The allowance for loans and leases is an estimation of the amount of loans that might 
be ultimately uncollectible. As Bella and Rose (2011) pointed out, an adequate LLR is a safety 
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and soundness issue because a deficit in LLR implies that the bank’s capital ratios overstate its 
ability to absorb unexpected losses. Higher loan loss reserve ratio means banks are more 
prepared to loan default risks. We expected this variable to negatively affect the failure of banks. 
Table 1 Summary of Variables, Formulas, and Expected Sign   
 
Loan and Leases to Total Assets (LLTA) is calculated by dividing total loan and leases 
to total assets. Unlike cash and due from banks that are liquid assets available immediately, loans 
and leases are not liquidated until the signed term expires. Therefore, loans and leases are risky. 
Failure was more likely for banks with larger ratios of loans to assets (Wheelock et al., 2000).  
This ratio is designed to capture the portion of banks’ total assets that are at risk. Shaffer’s (2012) 
logit regression result also indicated a significant correlation between loan to asset ratio and bank 
failure in the 2008 bank sample. Therefore, we expect high LLTA to have a positive impact on 
possibility of bank failure. That is, the more loans and leases a bank holds, the higher possibility 
of failure in the future. 
Variable Formula/Description Expected Sign 
GDP growth(GDP) Quarterly growth rate of GDP - 
Loan Loss Reserve (LLR) Loan and leases allowance/Total Assets - 
Loan and Leases to Assets Ratio 
(LLTA) 
Total Loan and Leases/Total Assets + 
Real Estate Loan Ratio (RE) Real estate loan/Total Loans + 
Liquid Ratio Total Cash and due from banks/Total Assets - 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio (T1CR) Tier 1 Capital/Total Risk-Weighted Assets - 
Total Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio 
(TCR) 
Total Risk Based Capital/Risk –Weighted Assets - 
Leverage Ratio (Leverage) Tier 1 Capital/Total tangible Assets - 
Non-Performing Loan Ratio 
(NPLR) 
Non-performing loans and leases/Total Assets + 
Gross Revenue (GrossRev) Tier 1 Capital/(Total interest and non-interest 
income) 
- 
Return on Assets (ROA) Net income/Total Assets - 
Size of Banks (Size) Ln(Total Assets) ? 
FAIL Dummy Variable(Filed=1, Non-failed=0) Dependent 
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Gross Domestic Product growth rate (GDP) is a commonly used macroeconomic 
indicator of an economy (Cebula et al., 2011; Shim, 2012). The higher the growth rate of real 
GDP, the lower the bank failure rate, presumably because of the stronger economy implied by a 
higher GDP and the resulting better loan performance on bank balance sheets (Cebula et al., 
2011). Shim (2012) found that GDP growth rate is positively associated with bank default risk, 
which implies that the probability of bank insolvency is increasing during recessions. We predict 
GDP to have a negative correlation with the possibility of bank failure.   
Real Estate Loan Ratio (RE) is calculated by dividing total real estate loan to total loans. 
The subprime mortgage crisis of 2007/08, followed by financial crisis that started in mid-2008, 
have severely impacted the banking industry. Cole et al. (2011) argued that real estate loans play 
a critical role in determining survival of banks during the financial crisis. We expect this ratio to 
have a positive impact on the failure of banks, meaning that the more real estate loans a bank 
holds the more likely the bank will fail.  
Liquid ratio is calculated by dividing non-interest generating cash and due from banks to 
total assets. This variable captures the availability of liquid assets to mediate potential losses. 
Banks with a higher level of liquid assets that can readily be turned into cash when needed 
indicates that they have a greater ability to meet short-term financial obligations without having 
to result to untimely sale of investment or fixed assets (Shim 2013). We expect this variable to 
have a negative impact on bank failure, which means that the higher the liquid ratio of a bank, 
the less likely that the bank will fail.   
Tier 1 Capital Ratio (T1CR) is tier 1 capital to total risk-weighted assets. Tier 1 capital 
is a bank’s core capital and an essential indicator of a bank’s financial strength. Samad (2011) 
proved that there are significant difference between failed banks and survived banks with respect 
 11 / 26 
 
to tier 1 capital ratio. In addition, Samad et al. (2012) found that tier 1 risk-based capital to 
average assets are significant factors in explaining bank failures. We expect this variable to have 
a negative impact on possibility of failure of commercial banks. That is, banks with the higher 
the tier 1 capital ratio are less likely to fail. 
Total Risk-based Capital Ratio (TCR) is a capital adequacy indicator in addition to the 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio. By running ANOVA tests between failed and non-failed banks on Total 
Risk-based Capital Ratio, Samad (2011) concluded that there is a significant difference in capital 
holdings between failed and non-failed banks. In particular, the capital holding ratios of all non-
failed banks were significantly higher than those of failed banks. Thus, banks with higher capital 
adequacy ratios, T1CR and TCR, might be less likely to fail. Therefore, we expect this variable 
to have negative impact on the failure of banks. That is, banks with higher total risk-based capital 
ratio are less likely to fail. 
 Leverage Ratio (Leverage) is calculated by dividing tier 1 capital to total tangible assets. 
Leverage ratio assumes implicitly that capital needs of a bank are directly proportional to its 
level of assets (Estrella et al, 2000). Lower leverage ratio implies less risk based capital cushion 
compared to the size of the organization. Less capital cushion may increase the possibility of 
bank failure in financially difficult times. Estrella et al. showed that leverage ratio is a good 
predictor of bank failure, in addition to other complex capital ratios. We expect this ratio to have 
negative effect on bank failure. That is, the higher the leverage ratio of a bank, the lower the 
possibility of future failure.   
Non-Performing Loans Ratio (NPLR) is calculated by dividing non-performing loans 
by total loans. In our model, we calculated non-performing loans as the sum of loans and leases 
that are 30-89 days past due and still accruing interest, loans and leases that are 90 or more days 
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past due and still accruing interest, and nonaccrual loans and leases. We used this calculation 
because past literature (Cole et al. 2012) has included all these past due loans in their non-
performing assets variable. These loans and leases have already past due and are risky because 
the debt might be uncollectible, especially for nonaccrual loans and leases. This variable reflects 
the size of non-performing loans within total bank assets. If the ratio is relatively high, then 
losses on underwriting bad debts might be huge and potentially impact the solvency of the bank. 
Thus, we expect this variable has a positive effect of the failure of banks. That is, banks with 
more non-performing loans on account are more likely to fail. 
 Gross Revenue ratio (GrossRev) is calculated by dividing tier one capital to total 
interest and non-interest income. Estrella et al. (2000) denoted that gross revenue includes 
components associated with off-balance-sheet activities. Thus, gross revenue may reflect the 
riskiness of bank assets better than total assets. Their study result implied that gross revenue ratio 
is a simple and good predictor of bank failure. We expect this ratio to have a negative correlation 
with bank failure, which suggests that banks with higher gross revenue ratio will be less likely to 
fail.       
Return on Assets (ROA) is calculated by dividing net income by total assets. This ratio 
is frequently used as an indicator that reflects the efficiency of banks’ management on using their 
assets to generate profit (Cole and White, 2011; Shim, 2013; Samad and Glenn, 2012). Clearly, 
higher ROA means greater efficiency in converting assets into net income. Low ROA indicates 
less efficiency and that the organization is more likely to experience financial difficulty. We 
expect this variable to have negative impact on the failure of banks.    
Size is calculated by taking the natural logarithm of individual banks’ total assets. Small 
banks are more vulnerable compared to large banks during financial recession. Large banks tend 
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to be more diversified when managing capital assets and have easier access to the capital markets 
than smaller banks (Shim, 2013). As Cole and White noted, smaller banks, especially younger 
ones, are generally more prone to failure than are larger banks. However, large banks might be 
more prone to risky lending activities, which have potentially huge losses. Large banks have 
more opportunity to receive government assistance and funding during financially difficult times 
because the impact of a large bank’s failure could be substantial. Shim (2013) pointed out that 
there are possible moral hazard issues among large banks due to a government safety net through 
implicit “too big to fail” policies. Thus, we expect this variable to have a significant impact on 
bank failure, but we are unsure about the expected signed.  
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 Table 2 presents the summary of descriptive statistics for all variables used in three 
models. The summary includes data of an unbalanced panel of 165,255 quarterly observations 
divided into two groups, survived banks and failed banks.  Comparing the descriptive statistics of 
banks in the two groups, we observe that the Loan and Leases to Total Assets (LLTA), Real 
Estate loans ratio (RE), and Non-performing Loans Ratio (NPLR) are significantly higher for 
failed banks compared to survived banks. In addition, capital adequacy ratios of failed banks, 
such as Tier 1 Capital Ratio (T1CR), Total Risk-based Capital Ratios (TCR), and Leverage 
Ratios (Leverage), are significantly lower than that of survived banks. The differences indicate 
that failed banks have less risk-based capital cushion towards potential risks while bearing more 
risky assets at the same time.  
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
  Failed Banks Survived Banks 
  Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation 
LLTA .7397 .1167 .6402 .1550 
LLR .0234 .0177 .0164 .0102 
NPLR .0890 .0885 .0357 .0364 
ROA -.0078 .0215 .0033 .0112 
RealELoan .8006 .1501 .6961 .1881 
Liquid .0554 .0553 .0720 .0741 
T1CR .1036 .0654 .1608 .0829 
TCR .1158 .0648 .1723 .0825 
Leverage .0813 .0472 .1051 .0419 
GrossRev 2.8073 2.5652 3.9881 3.5627 
Size 12.3763 1.1827 12.0070 1.3220 
LLR is the loan loss reserve measured by loan allowance to total assets; LLTA is the total loan and leases to total 
assets; RealELoan is the real estate ratio measured by total real estate loans to total loans; Liquid is bank liquidity 
measured by cash and due from banks to total assets; NPLR is the non-performing loans ratio measured by non-
performing loans to total assets; ROA is return on assets calculated by net income to total assets as an indicator of 
bank management efficiency; Size is the indicator that measure firm size by taking the natural logarithm of total 
assets. T1CR is the tier one risk-based capital ratio measured by tier one capital to total risk-weighted assets. TCR is 
the total risk-based capital ratio measured by total risk-based capital to total risk-weighted assets, while leverage 




Table 3 represents the correlation matrix of variables. The regression results are 
presented in Table 4. Other variables being the same, Model I includes tier 1 risk-based capital 
ratio (T1CR) as capital adequacy indicator, while Model II includes total risk-based capital ratio 
and Model III includes leverage ratio (Leverage) as capital adequacy measurement. Loan and 
leases to total assets (LLTA), real estate ratio (RE), non-performing loans ratio (NPLR), and size 
are statistically significant and have positive influence on bank failure. Conversely, return on 
assets (ROA), liquid ratio (Liquid), GDP growth rate, loan loss reserve (LLR), and capital 
adequacy ratios are statistically significant and have negative influence on bank failure. At the 
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Table 3 Correlation matrix of variables 
 
GDP LLTA LLR NPLR ROA Liquid Gross Rev Size 
RealE 
Loan TCR T1CR 
LLTA .078 
          
LLR -.102 -.196 
         
NPLR .028 .208 -.481 
        
ROA -.075 -.092 .334 .128 
       
Liquid -.126 .153 -.148 -.073 .042 
      
GrossRev .076 .078 -.028 -.048 -.072 -.067 
     
Size -.004 .122 -.030 .071 -.098 .136 -.018 
    
RealELoan .000 -.071 .006 .013 .005 .028 -.006 .097 
   
TCR .002 -.067 -.158 -.018 -.009 -.012 .004 -.212 .010 
  
T1CR -.009 .212 .156 .039 -.019 -.010 -.005 .238 -.032 -.964 
 
Leverage .017 -.545 .006 -.010 .041 .120 -.161 -.070 .108 .053 -.294 
 
The significant and positive sign of total loan and leases to total assets indicates that 
banks with higher loan and leases are more likely to fail. Loans are typically the least liquid and 
most risky of bank assets (Wheelock et al., 2000). If a bank expands its lending activities without 
increasing capital, it is exposed to more risks and cannot fully liquidate these assets until the loan 
contracts are over. The coefficients of loan loss reserve ratio suggest that it is only a significant 
factor in model I but it is not significant in model II and model III. The negative correlation 
implies that if banks can increase one unit of loan loss reserve, holding all other variable 
unchanged, the bank’s possibility of failure will decrease by the coefficient. 
The regression result suggests size is significant at 10% level in model I but it is not 
significant in model II and III as we expected. The negative coefficient in model I implies that 
larger banks are less likely to fail. 
The positive and significant sign of real estate ratio suggests that increase in real estate 
loans will increase the possibility of bank failure. Increases in real estate lending activity are 
risky because of its long-time commitment of funds. If banks expand lending business to less 
qualified borrowers, they are exposed to higher loan default risks. This result is expected and is 
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consistent with previous literatures (Cole et al., 2011; Shaffer, 2012). The coefficients of non-
performing loans ratio (NPLR) are positive and significant in three models, indicating that a 
positive association between NPLR and the possibility of bank failure. Large coefficients suggest 
that one unit change in NPLR has great influence on bank failure compared to the effect of other 
variables. This result is consistent with previous literatures (Shaffer, 2012; Shim, 2013) and will 
encourage banks to take additional measures to assess borrowers’ credit risk and eliminate 
possibility of loan default. 
 




































  Model I Model II Model III 
Constant -5.284*** -5.240*** -7.234*** 
  
(.000) (.000) (.000) 
GDPGrowth -4.960*** -4.952*** -5.206*** 
  
(.000) (.000) (.000) 
LLTA 3.027*** 3.035*** 4.533*** 
  
(.000) (.000) (.000) 
LLR -3.990* -2.922 -1.680 
  
(.063) (.173) (.425) 
NPLR 11.067*** 11.062*** 11.607*** 
  
(.000) (.000) (.000) 
ROA -13.897*** -13.779*** -16.716*** 
  
(.000) (.000) (.000) 
Liquid -4.766*** -4.751*** -4.923*** 
  
(.000) (.000) (.000) 
GrossRev -.025*** -.024*** -.051*** 
  
(.001) (.001) (.000) 
Size -.022* -.012 .017 
  
(.088) (.376) (.186) 
RealELoan 2.165*** 2.157*** 1.942*** 
  
(.000) (.000) (.000) 
T1CR -13.756***     
  
(.000)     
TCR   -13.948***   
  
  (.000)   
Leverage     -11.973*** 
  
    (.000) 
Pseudo- .059 .059 .056 
 17 / 26 
 
LLR is the loan loss reserve, measured by loan allowance to total assets; LLTA is the total loan and leases to total 
assets; RealELoan is the real estate ratio measured by total real estate loans to total assets; Liquid is bank liquidity 
measured by cash and due from banks to total assets; NPLR is the non-performing loans ratio measured by non-
performing loans to total assets; ROA is return on assets calculated by net income to total assets as an indicator of 
bank management efficiency; Size is the indicator that measure firm size by taking the natural logarithm of total 
assets; GDPGrowth is the quarterly real Gross Domestic Product growth rate in 2005 dollar. T1CR is the tier one 
risk-based capital ratio measured by tier one capital to total risk-weighted assets. TCR is the total risk-based capital 
ratio measured by total risk-based capital to total risk-weighted assets, while leverage ratio is tier one capital to total 
tangible assets. Significance of each variable is presented in parentheses. 
* Statistical significant at 10% level. 
** Statistical significant at 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at 1% level  
 
The negative and significant signs of return on assets (ROA) show that more profitable 
banks are less likely to fail. This result would encourage banks to increase management 
efficiency in order to survive. In addition, ROA has a more significant influence on possibility of 
bank failure in model III, in which one unit increase of ROA will cause possibility of bank 
failure to decrease more than in other two models. Gross revenue ratio (GrossRev) is significant 
and negatively correlated with bank failure in all three models. This shows that there is an 
inverse relationship between banks’ gross revenue ratio and possibility of bank failure. As banks 
increase one unit of gross revenue, their possibility of becoming insolvent will decrease.   
 The coefficients of capital adequacy ratios, Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio (T1CR), 
Leverage ratio, and total risk-based capital ratio (TCR), are negative and statistically significant 
at 1% level. The result indicates that these capital ratios are significant factors that influence 
bank solvency. Nevertheless, model III with leverage ratio has less predicting power than other 
two models with risk-weighted capital ratios. This supports the result of Estrella et al. (2000) that 
risk-weighted ratio is the most effective predictor of failure over long time horizons. In particular, 
risk-weighted ratios do not consistently outperform leverage ratios in short horizons of less than 
two years. Since our study lasts more than five years, T1CR and TCR clearly have more 
predicting power. 
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4.2 Result based on different Total Assets 
Table 5 is a comparison of regression results for banks in different asset groups. Small 
banks are more vulnerable compared to large banks. Several scholars have addressed the 
correlation of bank size and bank survival during financial crisis. Wheelock and Wilson (2000) 
concluded that smaller banks are more likely to fail and be acquired than larger banks.  
We divide all banks into four groups according to their total asset: (1) banks with total 
assets less than 100 million dollars, (2) banks with total assets between 100 million dollars and 1 
billion dollars, (3) banks with total assets between 1 billion dollars and 10 billion dollars, and (4) 
banks with total assets more than 10 billion dollars. According to data provided by FDIC, the 
average tier 1 risk based capital ratio for banks in group (1) is 18.39%, and this ratio is 10.94% 
for banks in group (4). The average real estate loans to total asset ratio is 17.9% for banks in 
group (1), 29.9% for banks in group (2), and 8.9% for banks in group (4). The large difference 
attracts our attention. Small banks and large banks may have different banking characteristics 
such that financial ratios will also have different impact on the possibility of failure. 
In the previous section, model II with total risk-based capital ratio as a capital indicator 
has the best predicting power, and we are thus using this model in this section. An overview of 
table 5 shows that these results are consistent with the regression results in the previous section. 
The table indicates that loan and leases to total assets (LLTA), real estate ratio (RE), and liquid 
ratio are significant in all three groups at 1% level. Other variables have mixed results on bank 
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Table 5 Regression result according to banks' total assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Asset<100M 100M<Asset<1B 1B<Asset<10B Asset>10B 
Constant 
-5.022*** -3.421*** -4.404*** 7.115 
  (.000) (.000) (.004) (.115) 
GDPGrowth 
-7.840*** -3.919*** .367 -15.164*** 
  (.000) (.000) (.808) (.001) 
LLTA 2.681*** 3.282*** 4.268*** -6.350*** 
  (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
LLR 13.013*** -10.541*** -19.383** 73.435*** 
  (.001) (.000) (.021) (.002) 
NPLR 8.774*** 10.843*** 11.889*** 4.774 
  (.000) (.000) (.000) (.307) 
ROA 
-21.615*** -8.823*** 10.600** 17.839 
  (.000) (.000) (.020) (.205) 
RealELoan 1.147*** 3.041*** 1.578*** 5.138*** 
  (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) 
Liquid 
-5.147*** -4.973*** -2.962** -22.457*** 
  (.000) (.000) (.044) (.007) 
TCR 
-2.058*** -24.623*** -45.703*** -61.025*** 
  (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
GrossRev 
-.021* -.023** -.010 .038 
  (.071) (.023) (.751) (.679) 
Size 
-.112* -.116*** .160* -.188 
  (.093) (.000) (.084) (.349) 
Pseudo- .026 .081 .097 .062 
Failed banks 98 300 53 19 
Number of Observations 59,742 90,597 10,643 1,908 
LLR is the loan loss reserve, measured by loan allowance to total assets; LLTA is the total loan and leases to total 
assets; RealELoan is the real estate ratio measured by total real estate loans to total assets; Liquid is bank liquidity 
measured by cash and due from banks to total assets; NPLR is the non-performing loans ratio measured by non-
performing loans to total assets; ROA is return on assets calculated by net income to total assets as an indicator of 
bank management efficiency; Size is the indicator that measure firm size by taking the natural logarithm of total 
assets; GDPGrowth is the quarterly real Gross Domestic Product growth rate in 2005 dollar. T1CR is the tier one 
risk-based capital ratio measured by tier one capital to total risk-weighted assets. TCR is the total risk-based capital 
ratio measured by total risk-based capital to total risk-weighted assets, while leverage ratio (Leverage) is tier one 
capital to total tangible assets. Significance of each variable is presented in parentheses. 
* Statistical significant at 10% level. 
** Statistical significant at 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at 1% level  
 
Loan loss reserve ratio (LLR) is a significant factor in all groups except group (3). The 
positive coefficients in group (1) and (4) indicate positive relationships for largest and smallest 
banks with possibility of failure, meaning that more loan allowance will increase banks’ 
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insolvency risks. However, for banks in group (2) and (3), the negative sign implies that banks 
with more loan allowance will be less likely to fail. This result may imply that smallest and 
largest banks have enough loan allowance prepared for default risks that setting more asset aside 
will impact the organization’s financial solvency due to high cost of capital. Loan and leases to 
total assets ratio (LLTA) is significant in all four groups. The positive coefficients of group (1), 
(2), and (3) indicate that writing more loans and leases will increase possibility of bank failure. 
However, the negative coefficient for group (4) implies that increased writing of loans and leases 
will help banks to survive financial difficulties. This result may imply that small or medium size 
banks are bearing too much loans and leases on account, while the largest banks are well 
diversified with their asset.    
The positive and significant sign of non-performing loans ratio (NPLR) in groups (1) 
through (3) implies that NPLR has a positive correlation with possibility of bank failure on banks 
in these groups. This result suggests that banks that bearing more bad debt are more likely to fail. 
The coefficients in each group increase as banks become larger implies that one unit increase of 
bad debt will cause higher possibility of bank failure in larger banks than smaller ones. The 
positive and significant signs of real estate ratio (RealELoan) imply that increase in real estate 
loans will increase banks’ possibility of failure. It is also observed that groups with larger banks 
have greater coefficients, which suggests that increase in one unit of real estate loans will have 
greater impact on the solvency of larger banks. Therefore, large banks should be more cautious 
when writing additional real estate loan contracts 
The negative and significant sign of total risk-based capital ratio for banks in all four 
groups implies that the higher total risk based capital as financial cushion, the less likely the 
banks will fail. As banks’ total assets increase the coefficients of the variable decreases further, 
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indicating that total risk-based capital ratio has greater negative influence on bank failure as 
banks’ total asset increase. Therefore, banks should adjust capital buffer according to bank size. 
Size is only a significant factor at 1% level for banks in group (2) while it is significant at 10% 
level for bank failure in group (1) and (3). The negative and significant coefficients in groups (1) 
and (2) indicates a negative influence on banks with total assets less than 1 Billion dollars while 
the positive coefficient for group (3) implies that banks in this group are more likely to fail when 
they become larger. The negative and significant sign of liquid ratio for banks in all groups 
implies that it is negatively correlated with possibility of bank failure. In addition, the coefficient 
decreases dramatically in group (4). This implies that more liquid assets for banks in group (3) 
will have a greater effect on bank solvency than smaller banks.  
The coefficient of return on asset (ROA) is negative and significant for banks in group (1) 
and (2), indicating a negative correlation between ROA and possibility of bank failure. For small 
banks, increase in bank efficiency will help banks remain solvent. Gross Revenue ratio only has 
significant impact on banks in group (1) and (2) with negative sign. This implies that efforts to 
increase banks’ gross revenue will decrease banks’ possibility of failure for small banks.  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we use commercial bank data for the period 2007:Q1 – 2012:Q3 to provide 
empirical evidence of relationships between bank financial ratios and bank failures during the 
recent financial crisis. The regression results support our hypothesis that bank specific 
characteristics, together with macroeconomic indicator, play an important role in determining 
bank failures during the recent financial crisis. Regression results suggest that the ratio of the 
loan and leases to total assets, real estate loan ratio, non-performing loans ratio, and bank size 
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have a positive influence on bank failure. In contrast, return on assets, liquid ratio, gross revenue 
ratio, leverage ratio, and GDP growth rate have a negative impact on bank failure as expected.  
Our results suggest that financial ratios have different influences on bank failures when 
we repeat regressions using the sub-grouped data. The increase in the ratio of the loan and leases 
to total assets has a negative impact on the bank failure for banks with assets more than 10 
billion dollars, while it has a positive impact on bank failure for banks with assets less than 10 
billion dollars. Interestingly, return on asset is negatively related to failures of smaller banks, but 
it is positively associated with larger banks’ failures.  
Consistent with previous literatures, we find that capital adequacy ratios such as tier 1 
capital ratio, total risk-based capital ratio, and leverage ratios are all significant predictors of a 
bank failure. Further studies may need to consider the impact of new Basel III regulation on the 
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AL       2 1 1     2    1  7 
AR  1          1        2 
AZ       3 2 1 1  2 1  1 1    12 
CA   2 3 3 3 3 8 2 4 4 2 3  1   1  39 
CO     1 1  1     2  3 1    9 
FL   1 1 2 1 3 8 6 8 10 5 2 4 5 2 2 2 1 63 
GA   1 4 4 5 10 6 7 2 5 7 6 8 5 4 4 1 4 84 
IA       1         1    2 
ID      1              1 
IL    1 3 3 10 5 3 9 3 1 3 1 3 2 3 1 3 54 
IN       1        1  1   3 
KS   1  1 1  1   1 2   1    1 9 
KY       1             1 
LA         1       1    2 
MA          1          1 
MD     1  1  1  2 1      2  8 
MI    1  1  3  3 1 1 1 1   1   13 
MN  1    1 2 3 4 2 1 1  1  1 2 1 1 21 
MO 2     1 1 1 1 3  2    1   2 14 
MS          1    1      2 
NC      2       1   1  1  5 
NE     1     1      1    3 
NJ      1 1    1     1  1  5 
NM         1 1   1       3 
NV   3  1 1 1  1 2 1   1      11 
NY       1  2  1         4 
OH       1 1 1  1         5 
OK       1    1  2     1  5 
OR     2  1  1  2         6 
PA       1     2   1  1   6 
PR          3          3 
SC          1 3  1 1 1   2  9 
SD       1             1 
TN                 2 1  3 
TX    2   2 3 1      1     9 
UT     1 1   3       1    6 
VA        1   1    2     4 
WA     1 1 1  4 3 2 2  2 1     17 
WI        1   1 1 3       6 
WV   1                 1 
WY       1             1 
Total 2 2 9 12 21 24 50 45 41 45 41 30 26 22 26 18 16 15 12 460 
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Total 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
AK 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
AL 132 3 135 130 3 133 132 3 135 131 3 134 
AR 120 4 124 120 4 124 121 3 124 122 2 124 
AZ 36 36 35 35 32 32 30 30 
CA 246 6 252 246 4 250 243 2 245 240 2 242 
CO 103 103 103 103 100 100 100 100 
CT 44 44 43 43 43 43 43 43 
DC 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 
DE 33 33 33 33 31 31 31 31 
FL 214 6 220 213 4 217 213 2 215 213 1 214 
GA 239 6 245 234 3 237 231 2 233 228 2 230 
GU 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
HI 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
IA 340 1 341 341 1 342 337 1 338 335 1 336 
ID 16 16 17 17 17 17 17 17 
IL 542 10 552 541 9 550 537 6 543 534 3 537 
IN 107 1 108 108 108 109 109 111 111 
KS 305 5 310 305 4 309 303 2 305 304 2 306 
KY 176 4 180 177 3 180 177 3 180 178 1 179 
LA 136 1 137 134 1 135 132 1 133 129 1 130 
MA 148 148 147 147 145 145 146 146 
MD 51 51 50 50 50 50 51 51 
ME 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
MI 124 1 125 122 1 123 122 122 122 122 
MN 377 4 381 374 4 378 375 1 376 371 1 372 
MO 304 4 308 303 4 307 305 4 309 305 3 308 
MS 85 1 86 84 1 85 85 85 84 84 
MT 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
NC 86 1 87 85 1 86 84 1 85 83 1 84 
ND 90 90 90 90 90 90 88 88 
NE 210 2 212 209 2 211 209 2 211 206 2 208 
NH 18 18 17 17 17 17 17 17 
NJ 86 1 87 87 1 88 87 1 88 83 1 84 
NM 46 46 46 46 45 45 47 47 
NV 26 26 25 25 23 23 23 23 
NY 151 3 154 149 2 151 146 2 148 149 1 150 
OH 165 7 172 166 6 172 168 4 172 170 3 173 
OK 237 4 241 237 3 240 238 2 240 237 1 238 
OR 31 1 32 31 1 32 31 1 32 32 1 33 
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PA 181 4 185 180 4 184 179 3 182 181 3 184 
PR 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
RI 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
SC 60 3 63 62 3 65 60 2 62 58 2 60 
SD 80 80 80 80 80 80 79 79 
TN 173 3 176 174 2 176 172 2 174 174 1 175 
TX 585 8 593 583 6 589 582 5 587 585 1 586 
UT 54 54 54 54 54 54 52 52 
VA 105 1 106 104 1 105 103 103 103 103 
VI 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
VT 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
WA 70 2 72 66 2 68 64 2 66 66 1 67 
WI 248 5 253 249 4 253 251 2 253 252 1 253 
WV 59 2 61 58 1 59 58 1 59 58 1 59 
WY 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Total 6819 104 6923 6791 85 6876 6760 60 6820 6747 42 6789 
*Note: number of banks in each quarter may also due to mergers and acquisitions. 
 
